Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment

Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDOAEJnkKk0



Duration: 48:43
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Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/paul-milgrom-stanford-university-2023-10-26
Online and Matching-Based Market Design

Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare in the allocation problem but guarantee only 0% when accounting for investment incentives. An algorithm’s allocative and investment guarantees coincide if and only if its confirming negative externalities are sufficiently small. We introduce fast approximation algorithms for the knapsack problem that have no confirming negative externalities and guarantee close to 100% for both allocation and investment.







Tags:
Simons Institute
theoretical computer science
UC Berkeley
Computer Science
Theory of Computation
Theory of Computing
Online and Matching-Based Market Design
Paul Milgrom