ITCS 2022 Session 4

Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FdEuwH0DtY4



Duration: 1:02:40
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Chair: Yang Cai

Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar Lane, Guru Guruganesh, and Andres Perlroth (Google Research)
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)
Cursed yet Satisfied Agents
Yiling Chen and Alon Eden (Harvard University); Juntao Wang (GSAS, Harvard)
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders
Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann Institute); Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond
George Christodoulou (Univesity of Liverpool); Vasilis Gkatzelis and Daniel Schoepflin (Drexel University)

13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) Conference