Non-Revelation Mechanism Design: Inference, Optimization, and Approximation

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United States Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing
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Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvJf8xxBnAg


Duration: 45:13
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Jason Hartline, Northwestern University
Complexity and Simplicity in Economics
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/jason-hartline-10-13



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Tags:
Simons Institute
UC Berkeley
computer science
theory of computing
Economics and Computation
Jason Hartline