Privacy, Substitutes, and Optimization in Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions

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United States Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing
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Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXUVVOJg9mE


Duration: 32:37
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Ilya Segal, Stanford University
Complexity and Simplicity in Economics
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/ilya-segal-10-13



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Simons Institute
UC Berkeley
computer science
theory of computing
Economics and Computation
Ilya Segal