Stable Matching by Optimal Transport

Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6D92r1iR0P4



Duration: 33:05
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Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley)
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/federico-echenique-uc-berkeley-2023-10-26
Online and Matching-Based Market Design

We discuss a model of matching with aligned preferences, which serves to highlight the role of supply and demand imbalances in matching markets. Examples include organ donor exchange, as well as matching markets with transferable utility in which the bargaining over transfers takes place after a match is formed. We establish a connection between stability, fairness, and optimal transport for these markets. Special cases are studied, which yield additional results and insights.







Tags:
Simons Institute
theoretical computer science
UC Berkeley
Computer Science
Theory of Computation
Theory of Computing
Online and Matching-Based Market Design
Federico Echenique