The Substitution Metric and the Performance of Clock Auctions

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United States Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing
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Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUm8U_049BM


Duration: 49:05
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Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Complexity and Simplicity in Economics
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/paul-milgrom-10-13



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Tags:
Simons Institute
UC Berkeley
computer science
theory of computing
Economics and Computation
Paul Milgrom