Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

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United States Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing
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Published on ● Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4IRD1RlVYY


Duration: 31:08
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Jose Correa, Universidad de Chile
https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/jose-correa-3-28-18
Societal Networks



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Tags:
Jose Correa
Simons Institute
Theory of Computing
Theory of Computation
Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science
UC Berkeley
Societal Networks